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Abstract
We study the strategic choice of compatibility between two initially
incompatible software packages in a two-stage game by an incumbent
and an entrant ﬁrm. Consumers enjoy network externality in consump-
tion and maximise expected surplus over the two periods. Compatibil-
ity may be achieved by means of a converter. We derive a number of
results under diﬀerent assumptions about the nature of the converter
(one-way vs two-way) and the existence of property rights. In the case of
a two-way converter, which can only be supplied by the incumbent, in-
compatibility will result in equilibrium and depending on the strength
of network externalities the incumbent may deter entry. When both
ﬁrms can build a one-way converter and there are no property rights
on the necessary technical speciﬁcations, the only fulﬁlled expectations
subgame perfect equilibrium involves full compatibility. Finally, when
each ﬁrm has property rights on its technical speciﬁcations, full in-
compatibility and preemption are again observed at the equilibrium.
Entry deterrence will then occur for suﬃciently strong network eﬀects.
The analysis generalises to any market where network externalities are
present.
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The two related issues of compatibility and network externalities have, recently,
drawn large attention in the economic literature. The existence of signiﬁcant
demand externalities is recognised in a number of markets. The essential fea-
ture of demand externalities is that the individual beneﬁt from consumption
of the good or service is increasing in the number of people consuming the
same good or service. The sources of externalities are diﬀerent and range from
the presence of a physical network connecting consumers, as for telecommu-
nications, to the case of a virtual network, as for computers’ software and
other goods for which a community of interest eﬀect arises. The presence of
demand externalities raises the important question of compatibility whenever
users belonging to one network cannot beneﬁt from the presence of another
network of users who adopt an incompatible technology. With incompatibil-
ity, absent congestion problems, both sets of consumers cannot beneﬁt from
the externalities that would be possible by pooling the two networks. In this
paper we analyse the conﬂicting incentives that an incumbent ﬁrm faces when
deciding whether or not to make its good compatible with the one produced
by an entrant by means of a converter, under a variety of assumptions about
the nature of the converter.
We build a model in which there is an incumbent ﬁrm which produces a
durable software good subject to network externalities. In period 1 the ﬁrm is
the only producer and it faces entry in the second period by a potential entrant
who supplies an homogeneous good which incorporates a diﬀerent technology.
The assumption of homogeneity of the goods allows us to concentrate on the
eﬀect of compatibility choices and of installed bases of users on the pattern
of entry and on the feasibility of entry deterrence. Conceptually, the installed
base of a network good serves the same purpose of irreversible investment in
physical capacity for the incumbent. Whereas, absent switching costs, output
decisions have no commitment value, in the presence of network externalities
and incompatibility, the incumbent can strategically choose the level of ﬁrst
period output in order to reduce the rival’s scale of entry or to preempt it
altogether.
We explore diﬀerent scenarios concerning the way compatibility is achieved.
In particular we consider the following three cases:
1. Compatibility through two-way converters supplied by the incumbent;
2. Compatibility through one-way converters supplied by the incumbent
and the entrant;
3. Compatibility through one-way converters supplied by the incumbent
2and the entrant subject to disclosure of each other technical speciﬁca-
tions.
In the ﬁrst case, the incumbent may produce, at no cost, a two-way con-
verter which induces perfect compatibility between the two network of users.
In the second case, each ﬁrm can freely design a converter which allows its
customers to communicate with the customers of the rival ﬁrm. Finally, in the
third scenario, ﬁrms have to possibility to deny the other ﬁrm the technical
speciﬁcations needed to build any converter.
Examples of each of the three scenarios can be easily found for the soft-
ware market. A two way converter corresponds to the ability, provided by
many softwares, to read and save in the rival’s format. In text processing, for
example, Word allows to read and save in WordPerfect’s format. The unilat-
eral provision of this feature allows users of both softwares to communicate
and therefore the relevant installed base for each software becomes the entire
population of text processing softwares. Adobe Acrobat allows both reading
and saving in postscript format. In the streaming media industry both Ap-
ple’s QuickTime and Microsoft Windows Media Player can playback and save
in each other proprietary format (.mov and .wav respectively) and other com-
mon format MPEG (Moving Picture Experts Group) whose development is
supervisioned by the The Internet Streaming Media Alliance (ISMA), a non-
proﬁt corporation formed to provide a forum for the creation of speciﬁcation(s)
that deﬁne an interoperable implementation for streaming rich media (video,
audio and associated data) over Internet Protocol (IP) networks.
Examples of one way converters can take diﬀerent forms. Software may
allow reading but not saving in a diﬀerent format or viceversa. It is interesting
to note the diﬀerence between these two cases. If software A allows reading
but not saving ﬁle produced with software B, then users of the former can read
ﬁles from the latter but cannot exchange their ﬁles with the users of software
B. In the opposite case things are reversed.
In recent years a number of commercial software vendors have introduced
so-called viewers. These are a downgraded free version of their main software
that allows non-users to view and print ﬁles prepared with their software.
These viewers accomplish the same result produced by a converter which allows
saving in but not reading a diﬀerent format, the only diﬀerence being that the
transaction cost of conversion rests on the users of the other software1. An
additional advantage of viewers over converters for software vendors is that
they do not have to cope with a variety of diﬀerent formats and to depend
1Examples of such viewers are Word Viewer, PDF Viewer, Excel Viewer. Shapiro and
Varian (1999, ch.9) discuss examples of how adapters can be used by a ﬁrm to interconnect
with a rival’s network.
3on the disclosure of technical speciﬁcations by the rivals. For this reason the
second scenario analysed in the paper ﬁts the example of the viewers while the
third better illustrates the case of a converter allowing saving but not reading
in the rival format (or viceversa).
The three scenarios described above are analysed under the assumption
that i) demand in the second period is the residual from demand in period 1
and that ii) consumers maximise total net surplus over the two periods.2
Compatibility increases the value of the ﬁrm’s network but increases com-
petition since it makes products homogenous. The incumbent ﬁrm has to give
up the advantage it enjoys over the entrant thanks to its installed base of users
and forecloses the possibility of entry deterrence.
Quite surprisingly, although the literature about entry, compatibility and
standardisation in network industries is well developed,3 it focuses mainly on
the analysis of two-way compatibility, usually introduced either via the con-
struction of an adapter or via the disclosure of technical speciﬁcation by the
operating ﬁrms. Farrell and Saloner (1992) discuss the incentive for a domi-
nant ﬁrm to refuse the disclosure of its technical information to construct an
adapter by a rival ﬁrm. In a diﬀerent context, we ﬁnd a similar result when the
incumbent and the entrant ﬁrms play a ”disclosure game” such that each ﬁrm
has to decide, sequentially, on whether to provide its technical speciﬁcation
to the rival. Furthermore we ﬁnd that at the equilibrium, the dominant ﬁrm
might be able to deter entry by denying the construction of a one-way adapter
to the entrant. The provision of a two-way adapter is also studied in Baake
and Boom (2001); in a symmetric setting, they ﬁnd that in equilibrium the
adapter is always provided. Our results show that this ﬁnding is sensitive to
the symmetric vs asymmetric position of the competing ﬁrms.
This result has interesting policy implications and suggests that antitrust
authorities may have a role in promoting competition via information disclo-
sure obligations.
In the case of a more simple compatibility decision, where each ﬁrms is free
to build a one-way adapter with the rival technology, the result goes in the
opposite direction and entry with full two-way compatibility is the equilibrium
outcome. Contrary to the previous case, this result suggests a pro-competitive
role of network externalities, a feature that has already been studied in the
recent paper by Economides (1996b).
Summing up, the main message of the paper is that (costless) compatibil-
ity between incumbent and entrant may or may not be achieved depending
2In an extended version of this paper we have also investigated the case of independent
demands in the two periods and of myopic behavior of consumers. The qualitative features
of the results remain largely unaﬀected.
3See Matutes and Regibeau (1996) and Economides (1996b) for excellent surveys.
4on i) the type of compatibility (one-way vs two-way) and ii) the process of
information disclosure necessary for the provision of the converter.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the basic framework,
section 3 describes the game and the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs while the strategic analysis
of compatibility is given in section 4. Section 5 ends the paper.
2 The model
The model is built on a two stage game: in the ﬁrst period there is a single
ﬁrm serving the whole market while in the second period entry may occur.
The model focuses on the strategic role of compatibility between the entrant
and the incumbent ﬁrm. In particular we model three diﬀerent patterns of
compatibility: i) full compatibility between the entrant and the incumbent
(two-way compatibility), ii) full incompatibility (two-way incompatibility), iii)
partial compatibility (one-way compatibility).
With full compatibility, users of the two goods communicate perfectly, ir-
respective of the adopted technology; if incumbent and entrant are fully in-
compatible then the opposite is true. Finally, with one way-compatibility the
users of the compatible technology can communicate with the users of the rival
technology but not viceversa. As it will be discussed later on in the paper, one-
way compatibility typically occurs between software products when a package
can read and save in rival’s format but not the other way round. Naturally,
the type of compatibility aﬀects consumers’ preferences.
2.1 Consumers
There is a population of consumers P uniformly distributed along the interval
[¡1;A], with A > 0, according to the individual basic willingness to pay r. r
is assumed independent of the size of the users’ network. Each consumer buys
a single unit of the good.
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), consumers form expectations about
the networks sizes in the two periods and enjoy network externalities: the
total willingness to pay increases with the expected dimension of the network.
We deﬁne ˆ x1
I as the expected network size of the incumbent in period 1
(i.e. the total number of expected sales in the ﬁrst period). In the second
period, if entry occurs, consumers, prior to their purchasing decision, observe
Firm 1’s realised output in period 1 (i.e. Firm 1’ installed base) and form
expectations about the network size of the two ﬁrms. Expectations on ﬁrms’
network dimension are related to the form of compatibility (two-way vs one-
way compatibility) adopted by each ﬁrm. We denote with ˆ yi the expected
5network size of ﬁrm i, i = I;E, in period 2 with:4
ˆ yI = x
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ˆ yE = ˆ x
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i represents the expected number of consumers purchasing the good
from ﬁrm i in period 2.
When the incumbent and the rival technologies are fully compatible then
¹;Á = 1; in this case users network size expectations are equal to the sum of
the two ﬁrms expected networks. When technologies are fully incompatible
(¹;Á = 0) expectations are formed with respect to each ﬁrm total expected
sales.
One-way compatibility represents the intermediate case, formally when
¹ = 1, Á = 0 or ¹ = 0, Á = 1, in which only one ﬁrm is compatible with the
other and not viceversa: for example if ¹ = 1 and Á = 0, the incumbent ﬁrm,
by means of an adapter or an hardware interface, is compatible with the ri-
val technology while the opposite is not true. In this case, since users of the
incumbent product can freely communicate with rival’s users they form their
expectations on the total amount of output sold while the same is not true for
those who adopt the entrant’s technology.
In other words, if the variety produced by the incumbent is compatible
with that produced by the entrant, ˆ yI contains the installed base of this latter.
The impact of the externality on total willingness to pay is given by a
function V(¢) of the expected size of the network that a consumer is deciding
to join as deﬁned above: for given expectations, the reservation price of con-
sumer type r0 is r0 + V(¢). We assume that the function V(¢) is monotonically
increasing in the expected size of the network; speciﬁcally we assume that
V0 > 0 e V00 · 0.
The assumption of a population uniformly distributed on [¡1;A] is equiv-
alent to say that demand is linear and decreasing with a vertical intercept
increasing in the level of expected network size. In order to derive the demand
functions we need to distinguish between the two periods of the game.
2.1.1 Demand in period 1
In the ﬁrst period, consumers are confronted with a binary decision: buy in
t = 1 or wait until t = 2. They take their ﬁrst period consumption decisions
rationally so as to maximise total expected net surplus over both periods.
4Henceforth E and I are used to denote the entrant and the incumbent respectively.
6A consumer behaving rationally buys in period 1 if and only if the following
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i i = I;E (3)
where CSt
i represents expected gross consumer surplus at time t, t = 1;2 when
purchasing from ﬁrm i, i = I;E. The ﬁrst condition ensures that buying in
period 1, the consumer enjoys positive total net surplus over the two periods;
the second ensures that buying in t = 1 is better than buying in t = 2.
If entry occurs, in duopoly equilibrium at time t = 2 the consumer must


















Knowing that the expected gross surpluses of type r consumer buying from
the incumbent ﬁrm are CS1
I = r+V(ˆ x1
I) and CS2
I = r+V(ˆ yI) in period 1 and
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I ´ Ã (5)
It turns out that, in equilibrium we need to consider the second constraint
only. Which of the two constraints is binding in equilibrium depends on the
sign of p2
I ¡ p1
I=2 ¡ [V(ˆ yI) ¡ V(ˆ x1
I)]=2. If this is negative(positive) then the
second(ﬁrst) constraint is binding. Suppose for the moment that p2
I > p1
I=2 +
[V(ˆ yI) ¡ V(ˆ x1
I)]=2. It is easy to show that second period demand for the
incumbent is zero. This result is accomplished by the incumbent ﬁxing the
price p2
I suﬃciently high. This pricing plan, as is well known from the literature
around the Coase’s Conjecture, is time inconsistent in that chocking second
period market is ex-post suboptimal for the monopolist. Since he has no way
of committing himself to such course of action, consumers will not believe that
the second period price will be set at a level suﬃciently high. Therefore we can
concentrate on the second condition. The total number of consumers meeting
this condition is x1
I = A ¡ Ã; therefore the market clearing condition implies
that the ﬁrst period demand function with optimising agents is simply: 5
p
1







5It is worth noting that only the expectations about the ﬁrst period network dimension
72.2 Demand in period 2
Second period demand is derived as a residual of ﬁrst period demand given
the realised ﬁrst period output. The necessary condition for having two active
ﬁrms in the second period is the following:
p
2
I ¡ V(ˆ yI) = p
2
E ¡ V( ˆ yE) (7)
where p2
i ¡V(¢) is the network size adjusted price for brand i. Let ´ be the com-
mon level of hedonic prices given in equation (7). According to the assumption
of uniformly distributed population and once recalled that x1
I consumers have
already purchased the good in the ﬁrst period, the number of consumers for
which r > ´ is equal to A¡x1









which can be rewritten as
A ¡ x
1
I + V(ˆ yI) ¡ p
2
I = A ¡ x
1
I + V( ˆ yE) ¡ p
2
E = xtot (8)




I = A ¡ x
1
I + V(ˆ yI) ¡ xtot p
2
E = A ¡ x
1
I + V( ˆ yE) ¡ xtot (9)
2.3 Firms
In period 1 the incumbent is the only active ﬁrm; in period 2 entry by a second
ﬁrm might occur and the two ﬁrms compete ` a la Cournot. The two ﬁrms incur
constant marginal cost (which we normalize to zero) and there is no other ﬁxed
cost. The two goods produced are homogeneous, in the sense that for equal
expected network sizes, the consumers are indiﬀerent between the two.
The two goods perform the same tasks but incorporate diﬀerent technolo-
gies (word processors, spreadsheets and many other software packages share
enter into the ﬁrst period demand externality function. Although counterintuitive this
has a clear explanation and it does not mean that consumers do not account for ˆ yi when
purchasing the good in the ﬁrst period. Consider (2): the expected net surplus from buying
in t = 1 naturally includes two gross surpluses: CS1
I and CS2
I. Expectations on second
period network size are in CS2
I; when considering the balance between buying today or wait
until the next period, which determines the demand in the ﬁrst period, see (3), CS2
I cancels
out with the analogous surplus obtained if the good is demanded in the second period. In
other words, the additional beneﬁt of the second period network externality on ﬁrst period
consumers valuations is enjoyed also when buying in the second period and it is therefore
irrelevant when the ﬁrst period decision has to be taken.
8this property). We do not explicitly model why technologies diﬀer; indeed, the
focus of our analysis is not on the introduction of new technologies by new
entrants, but rather, by assuming exogenously given technological diﬀerences,
we concentrate on the strategic use of converters/emulators/plug-ins to obtain
compatibility.
When ﬁrms set their outputs, they take consumers expectations as given.
This assumption is common in the literature, and implies that ﬁrms cannot af-
fect consumers’ expectations because they cannot credibly commit to a certain
level of output.6 In the following section we derive, by backward induction,
the Cournot equilibrium in the second period and the ﬁrst period monopolis-
tic equilibrium. Given the assumption of exogenous expectations, there is a
continuum of equilibria in both periods. We restrict the attention to the ful-
ﬁlled expectations equilibria, namely those where the expected network sizes
correspond to the actual ones.
3 The fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium
The equilibrium concept we use is that of fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium
(FEE). In each period we restrict our attention to those equilibria which satisfy
the condition that expected network sizes equal the actual ones. Ex-post
consumers expectations are correct.
The concept of FEE was ﬁrst introduced in the literature on networks in
the seminal paper by Katz and Shapiro (1985) and has been widely adopted
by other authors. The main advantage of FEE is that it restricts the number
of possible equilibria and it may be interpreted as a long run equilibrium
concept; in addition, FEE dispenses us from making ad hoc assumptions about
how consumers expectations are formed and updated, which is something that
would require a fully dynamic model.
The assumption of FEE is also useful in this two stage game; formally,
with respect the second period networks, ˆ x2
i, consumers have expectations at
the beginning of both periods: we should have therefore both ﬁrst period and
second period expectations about x2
i. By restricting the equilibria to those
that match expectations (in both periods), ﬁrst and second period expecta-
tions must be identical at the equilibrium. For the sake of simplicity, we can
therefore make no distinction between expectations formed at the beginning
of the ﬁrst and second stage. This clearly does not aﬀect the solution of the
game but makes the notation far less cumbersome.
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium cannot be generally granted
and depend on the exact speciﬁcation of the externality function V(¢). In order
6See Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Economides (1996) among others.
9to solve the model and to characterise the solutions, we need to specify the
functional form of the externality function; we assume the following
Assumption 1. The externality function is linear:
V(¢) = µ(¢) µ 2 [0; ¯ µ] and 0:704 < ¯ µ < 1
The parameter µ measures the strength of network externalities: for given
expectations on network dimension, a higher µ implies a higher willingness to
pay to belong to that network. µ is bounded above; we will show that this is
required to ensure existence of the FEE, that it is unique and stable. 7 The
ceiling ¯ µ varies according to the kind of compatibility we are considering. The
lower bound 0:704 for ¯ µ excludes from the analysis the very high levels of the
externality, those represented by a value of µ close to 1. Nonetheless this is not
a strong restriction mainly because in the reality the impact of the externality
rarely plays such a pervasive role. Furthermore, it applies only to a subset of
the model solutions. For this reasons we believe these restrictions do not aﬀect
the descriptive strength of the predictions of our model.
3.1 Payoﬀs
In this section we present the FE payoﬀs in the four possible outcomes of the
game: full compatibility (¹ = 1, Á = 1), full incompatibility (¹ = 0, Á = 0)
and partial compatibility (either ¹ = 1, Á = 0 or ¹ = 0, Á = 1). By solving
the game by backward induction, we start withe the last stage.
3.1.1 Second period Cournot equilibrium
Conditional on entry and given consumers expectations, in the second period
ﬁrms compete on outputs. Firms face the demand function (9); given the
ﬁrst period incumbent’s installed base x1







j = (A ¡ x
1
I + µ ˆ yj ¡ xtot)x
2
j (10)
This is a standard Cournot oligopoly; simple calculations show that incumbent











I + 2µ ˆ yE ¡ µ ˆ yI
3
(11)
7Note that with a strictly concave externality function, the existence of FEE is more
easily guaranteed, although additional assumptions are needed to ensure uniqueness.
10These expressions give the optimal quantity produced by each ﬁrm in the
second period as a function of consumers’ expectations about each ﬁrm network
size and given that x1
I customers have already purchased the good in the ﬁrst
period. FEE is derived by setting expected sales equal to the actual ones:
ˆ yI = x1
I +x2
I +¹x2
E and ˆ yE = x2
E +Á(x2
I +x1
I); solving the system of equations
(11) with fulﬁlled expectations, ﬁrms output in the second period given ﬁrst






A(µ(1 ¡ ¹) ¡ 1) + (µ(µ(¹Á ¡ 1) ¡ Á ¡ ¹ + 3) ¡ 1)x1
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A(µ(1 ¡ Á) ¡ 1) + (Áµ ¡ 1)x1
I
3 + µ(µ(1 ¡ ¹Á) + ¹ + Á ¡ 4)
(13)
In Appendix 1 we prove the existence and uniqueness of the FE second
period Cournot equilibrium. Depending on the values of the compatibility
parameters ¹ and Á, expressions (12) and (13) provide the output produced
by the incumbent and by the entrant under the diﬀerent compatibility regimes
that we have brieﬂy mentioned above. More discussion will follow later in
the paper when we solve various games which describe the optimal strategies
adopted by the two competitors on the choice of their products compatibility.
3.1.2 First period equilibrium
In the ﬁrst period, the incumbent acts as a monopolist and he recognises that
his ﬁrst period output decision has an impact on second period proﬁts. The
















I is the ﬁrst period demand faced by the incumbent as in (6) while p2
I is
the incumbent’s equilibrium price in the second period given in (9) and x2
I(x1
I)
is given in (12). Solving the incumbent maximisation problem it is easy to
derive the ﬁrst period production given consumers expectations on ﬁrst period














8It is easy to check that the second order condition is satisﬁed.
11Appendix 2 shows that the condition µ < ¯ µ is suﬃcient for having a unique
and stable equilibrium with fulﬁlled expectations. Furthermore, in the ap-
pendix we also present the ﬁrst period equilibrium output; this can be easily
obtained from (15) with the FE condition ˆ x1
I = x1
I.
We are now ready to present the FE payoﬀs in the four possible outcomes
of the game: full compatibility (¹ = 1, Á = 1), full incompatibility (¹ = 0,




A2(8µ3 + 192µ ¡ 176 ¡ 69µ2)
(6µ2 ¡ 25µ + 22)2 ¼E
c;c =
(µ ¡ 4)2A2
(6µ2 ¡ 25µ + 22)2
¼I
c;i = ¡
A2(60µ3 ¡ 176 + 252µ ¡ 11µ4 ¡ 155µ2 ¡ 6µ5)
(22 ¡ µ3 + 15µ2 ¡ 34µ)2 ¼E
c;i =
(¡µ2 + 13µ ¡ 4)2A2
(22 ¡ µ3 + 15µ2 ¡ 34µ)2
¼c
i;c = ¡
A2(104µ3 ¡ 17µ4 + µ5 + 368µ ¡ 176 ¡ 289µ2)




(22 + 16µ2 ¡ 2µ3 ¡ 33µ)2
¼I
i;i = ¡
A2(96µ3 ¡ 176 + 428µ ¡ 2µ5 ¡ 12µ4 ¡ 343µ2)
(22 ¡ µ3 + 16µ2 ¡ 42µ)2 ¼E
i;i =
(¡µ2 + 13µ ¡ 4)2A2
(22 ¡ µ3 + 16µ2 ¡ 42µ)2
where ¼I
c;c ¼E
c;c are respectively the incumbent and the entrant total proﬁts when
both goods are compatible (full compatibility); ¼I
c;i and ¼E
c;i are total proﬁts
when the good produced by the entrant is compatible but not the opposite
(one-way partial compatibility). Similarly, ¼I
i;c and ¼E
i;c are the proﬁts when
the entrant’s product is compatible but not the incumbent’s, and ﬁnally ¼I
i;i
and ¼E
i;i are the full incompatibility payoﬀs.
3.1.3 Entry preemption and full monopolistic proﬁt
So far we have proceeded assuming that in the second period entry occurs.
In some circumstances, this may no longer be the case and entry by a rival
technology can be discouraged by the incumbent. Hence, before moving on, it
is necessary to deﬁne the incumbent’s proﬁt when in t = 2 entry does not occur.
As it will become clear later, entry of an incompatible rival is discouraged at
the FE equilibrium when µ is suﬃciently strong: in this case, by producing a
suﬃcient level of output in the ﬁrst period, the incumbent is able to preempt
the rival thus avoiding entry.
Let us deﬁne a trigger value of µ according to the following:
Proposition 1. Let µP = 0:315. If µ ¸ µP then in the market there is no
room for an incompatible rival (Á = 0) and entry is preempted.




into the ﬁrms proﬁt functions. The algebra, available on request, is particularly tedious and
for the sake of brevity we omit it.
12Proof. Entrant’s equilibrium output is given in (13) where x1
I is given by (20)
in the appendix. When the entrant is incompatible (Á = 0), it is easy to verify that
x2







¯ ¯ ¯Á=0 = ¡
1
3 ¡ 4µ + µ(¹ + µ)
For µ < 1 this is always negative; furthermore the above expression becomes more
negative the stronger the network eﬀect: for a suﬃcient level of µ the incumbent, by
expanding ﬁrst period output, has the power to foreclose the market thus preventing
entry. With fulﬁlled expectations, the one-way incompatible entrant’s outputs when
the incumbent is compatible/incompatible are respectively:
x2
Ej¹=1;Á=0 =
µ2 ¡ 13µ + 4
15µ2 ¡ µ3 ¡ 34µ + 22
x2
Ej¹=0;Á=0 =
µ2 ¡ 13µ + 4
16µ2 ¡ µ3 ¡ 42µ + 22
Preemption occurs whenever x2
E · 0. From the above expressions, both these out-
put levels are negative or equal to 0 when µ ¸ 0:315.
The FEE can be derived following a procedure similar, although much
simpler, to the one applied for the duopolistic case. For the sake of brevity we
restrict ourself to the presentation of the equilibrium output and proﬁts.10
Without entry in the second period, expectations are only on incumbent’s
network and compatibility is not an issue; demand functions are:
p
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Solving the proﬁt maximisation problem in the second period yields a FE






A ¡ (1 ¡ µ)x1
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2 ¡ µ






µ2 ¡ 9µ + 10
and the total proﬁt for the monopolist is therefore:
¼
mon = 5
(µ ¡ 3)2 A2
(µ2 ¡ 9µ + 10)2 (16)
10Again, the complete derivation of the full monopolist case is available on request.
134 The strategic analysis of compatibility
We explore three diﬀerent scenarios concerning the way compatibility is achieved:
1. Compatibility through two-way converters supplied by the incumbent;
2. Compatibility through one-way converters supplied by the incumbent
and the entrant;
3. Compatibility through one-way converters supplied by the incumbent
and the entrant subject to disclosure of each other technical speciﬁca-
tions.
Let look at each in detail.
4.1 Compatibility through two-way converter
In this case the bridge between the two, otherwise incompatible, technologies is
provided by means of a two-way converter which allows users of both goods to
communicate perfectly. This amounts to assume that the use of the converter
does not downgrade the performance. Allowing for performance disruption
is an easy task from which we abstain to avoid cumbersome notation. Many
software packages oﬀer the possibility to read and save in rival’s formats. We
assume that the decision to build a converter is up to the incumbent ﬁrm in
stage 1 and that the ﬁrm incurs no cost in the production of the converter.11
Also, we assume that the incumbent can credibly commit to such course of
action either by making the converter available right at the beginning of t =1
or by including such a clause in the contract signed with its customers.
Compatibility implies that the size of the relevant network for customers of
both goods is the same and equal to total amount of output sold. Consumers in
period 1 contemplating the purchase of the good incorporate this information
in their expectations. Formally, this is equivalent to saying that we have only
one compatibility parameter, or ¹ = Á; therefore consumers expectations are:
ˆ yI = ˆ x
2





ˆ yE = ˆ x
2





11In later sections we show that the case of two-way converter supplied by the entrant
yields trivial results. Note also that the assumption of zero costs for the converter is broadly
consistent with the observation that converters are often a simple add-on to much more
complex software whose development costs are much more relevant.
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Figure 1: The time line with two-way converter
where ¹ = 0 implies that no converter is built, and ¹ = 1 otherwise.12 The
time line is represented in Fig. 1.
4.2 Compatibility through one-way converters
In this scenario each ﬁrm has the ability to build a one-way converter, which
allows, without altering performance, one-way compatibility to the users of its
product. As an example think of a software package that can read ﬁles created
by other packages but cannot save in their format. More generally, one-way
compatibility happens when a component from one system works in the other,
but the reverse is not true (Katz and Shapiro, 1994). One-way converters allow
one of the technologies to obtain the network externalities accruing from the
installed base of the other but not viceversa (David and Buun, 1988).
Again, the incumbent chooses ¹ at the beginning of the game and can
credibly commit to this decision. The rival chooses whether to build or not
to build the converter at time t = 2 having observed the incumbent’s choices.
The eﬀect of these decisions on the size of the relevant networks has been
already described in the previous subsection. Formally we have:
ˆ yI = ˆ x
2





ˆ yE = ˆ x
2





where Á = 0 implies that the entrant builds no converter, and Á = 1 otherwise
and ¹ has the same meaning of the previous case. The timeline is represented
in Fig. 2. It should be noted that we have implicitly assumed that one-way
compatibility allows the ﬁrm providing it to reap the full beneﬁts of enlarged
12Compatibility levels however may take intermediate values between 0 and 1. We do not
consider this possibility. This does not result in a severe loss because, given the assumption
that the cost of compatibility, through converters, is zero, one can easily show that the
entrant will always choose full compatibility, and that the incumbent will prefer extreme to
intermediate values.
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Figure 2: The time line with one-way converters
network size. This amounts to assume that the network externality enjoyed by
consumers of the one-way compatible good are independent of the provision
of the converter by the ﬁrm producing the other good.
4.3 Compatibility through one-way converters and dis-
closure of technical speciﬁcations
In this last case, the two ﬁrms have property rights on the technical speciﬁ-
cations that are needed to build a one way converter. Alternatively we can
think of the case in which in order to build a converter access is required to
information that is privately owned by ﬁrms.
This implies that each ﬁrm has to decide whether or not to disclose such
information to the rival, which in turn has to decide what to do with this
information. Using the same notation, this time the incumbent ﬁrm chooses
Á = 1 if information is disclosed, or Á = 0 otherwise. Similarly, the entrant
chooses ¹. Once oﬀered the information each ﬁrm decides about the building
of the converter; we call this decision accept or reject. The eﬀect on the size
of the relevant networks is again the same as previously described. The time
line is represented in Fig.(3).
5 Results

















Figure 3: The time line with one-way converters and information disclosure
5.1 Compatibility through two-way converter
In this scenario, the incumbent can unilaterally choose whether the two goods
are fully compatible or not.13 By choosing compatibility the incumbent accrues
to the value of its network in both periods through consumers expectations but,
at the same time, increases rival’s competitiveness because, with compatibil-
ity, the incumbent shares the ﬁrst period installed base with the entrant, thus
making its product perfectly homogeneous with the rival’s. Furthermore, com-
patibility makes entry deterrence unfeasible due to the sharing of the installed
base.
Proposition 2. The incumbent always chooses incompatibility (¹ = 0); for
µ ¸ µP entry is deterred.
Proof. Suppose µ < µP: entry occurs. From the expressions ¼I
c;c and ¼I
i;i it
can be veriﬁed that for any value of µ, ¼I
i;i > ¼I
c;c: the incumbent always gain from
incompatibility. Therefore at t = 1, the the incumbent goes for incompatibility.
Suppose now that µ ¸ µP. In this case we need to compare ¼I
c;c with ¼mon given
in expression 16. Since ¼mon > ¼I
c;c then ¹ = 1, which induces entry deterrence, is
again the optimal incumbent’s strategy.
The advantage from increasing the size of the incumbent network through
compatibility is small, and the strategic eﬀect of a dominant position in the
market prevails.
It is noteworthy that entry deterrence becomes feasible, under incompati-
bility, for µ ¸ µP. The strategic eﬀect mentioned above is thus reinforced and
the incumbent prefers to be incompatible to achieve deterrence.
Consumers maximise their expected surplus across the two periods; high
expected prices in period 2 increase demand in period 1, when the incumbent
13We do not consider the opposite case where the compatibility decision is up to the














Figure 4: The game tree with one-way converters
is a monopolist. Incompatibility, then has the additional beneﬁt of allowing
the incumbent to charge in period 2 a price which is higher than that charged
by the rival and this increases ﬁrst periods sales.
Incompatibility is chosen whatever µ and deterrence occurs for µ ¸ µP.
5.2 Compatibility through one-way converters
The time line is depicted in Fig.2 above and the extended game tree is repre-
sented in Fig. 4. The incumbent’s decision to build a converter is taken before
production in the ﬁrst period takes place, at the beginning of the second pe-
riod; the entrant, having observed the incumbent’s choice, decides whether to
build a converter itself.
Proposition 3. For any possible value of µ, the only subgame perfect FE
equilibrium involves both players building a converter (full compatibility: ¹ = 1,
Á = 1).
Proof. In the second stage of the game, the entrant decides whether to build the
converter. Observing the payoﬀ functions it is immediate to verify that irrespective







Naturally, this holds also for µ ¸ µP since in this case entry of an incompatible rival
cannot occur and ¼E
c;i = ¼E
i;i = 0.
18Moving backward, since ¼I
c;c > ¼I
i;c then also for the incumbent is optimal to be com-
patible with the entrant.
This result is driven by the behavior of the entrant whose dominant strat-
egy is to build the converter. By doing so, the entrant enlarge its relevant
network with the installed base of the incumbent, which in turn prefers to
to be compatible itself with a one-way compatible rival. Under this scenario,
entry cannot be prevented by the incumbent and the entrant is on an equal
footing with the incumbent which loses its ﬁrst mover advantage.
Corollary 1. Entry of a one-way compatible entrant cannot be discouraged.
5.3 Compatibility through one-way converters and in-
formation disclosure
Under this scenario, the incumbent ﬁrm makes a commitment at the beginning
of period 1 about disclosure of the technical info required for the building of
the converter by the entrant. The same decision is taken by the entrant at
the beginning of period 2 when the two ﬁrms decide, if given the opportunity
by the rival, to build the converter, before competing in quantities. The game
tree is given in Fig. 5.
Proposition 4. The FE subgame perfect equilibrium involves:
1. full incompatibility if µ < µP;
2. entry deterrence if µ ¸ µP.
Proof. We determine the equilibrium by backward induction. Consider ﬁrst
the case with µ < µP; in this situation, entry cannot be prevented by the incumbent
who, conditional on information being disclosed by the entrant (¹ = 1), at the last
stage of the game (t = 4) has to decide whether to accept the oﬀer on not. There
are three nodes where the incumbent is asked to decide; these are represented by
the following paths of actions:
1. Incumbent oﬀers its technical speciﬁcations, Á = 1, Entrant accepts and oﬀers
¹ = 1;
2. Incumbent oﬀers its technical speciﬁcations, Á = 1, Entrant rejects and oﬀers
¹ = 1;
3. Incumbent refuses information disclosure, Á = 0, Entrant oﬀers ¹ = 1.
Looking at Fig. 5, it is easy to see that if the incumbent is asked to accept/reject








































Figure 5: The game tree with one-way converters and information disclosure
20At t = 3, the rival has to decide on whether to disclose its information by knowing
that if information is disclosed, the incumbent will use it in order to provide a
compatible product and to obtain a higher payoﬀ. As clearly represented by the
game tree, the rival is called to make such decision at three diﬀerent nodes of the
tree:
1. Incumbent oﬀers its technical speciﬁcations, Á = 1, Entrant accepts;
2. Incumbent oﬀers its technical speciﬁcations, Á = 1, Entrant rejects;
3. Incumbent denies information disclosure, Á = 0.
From the payoﬀ functions it is simple to check that for the entrant is optimal to








Furthermore, the stage before, the entrant has to accept/reject Á = 1 conditional on
the oﬀer being made by the incumbent. According to the payoﬀ function, the rival
accepts the oﬀer since ¼E
i;i < ¼E
i;c.
Finally, by knowing these sequence of decisions, the ﬁrst period monopolist decides
about the disclosure of its technical speciﬁcations at the beginning of the game;
according to what has been discussed above, the incumbent opts not to reveal its
information given that ¼I
i;i < ¼I
i;c. This is enough to show that the only subgame
perfect FE equilibrium when µ < µP is the full incompatibility regime where both
the ﬁrms do not disclose their speciﬁcations.
If µ ¸ µP there is no room for entry of an incompatible rival (when Á = 0): by
choosing not to reveal its speciﬁcations, the monopolist can prevent entry. From
¼I
c;c) and ¼I
i;c it is easy to verify that monopolist’s proﬁts are always bigger than the
proﬁts that the incumbent would obtain if entry occurs: ¼m > max[¼I
c;c;¼I
i;c].
This implies that the incumbent will always deter entry by not disclosing the infor-
mation.
This result is interesting: when the impact of network externalities is small
enough, both ﬁrms decide not to disclose information to the rival. With
stronger network externalities, the incumbent by denying its technical speci-
ﬁcations is also able to deter entry. This result contradicts the predictions of
existing literature on the eﬀects network externalities. For example in Econo-
mides (1996b) it is shown that network eﬀects move pro-competitively and
an incumbent technology may have incentive to invite entry of a compatible
entrant provided that network eﬀects are suﬃciently strong.
Our result is driven mainly by the timing of the events that we have mod-
elled here. While the incumbent would like to accept the rival’s oﬀer of com-
patibility at the last stage of the game, the entrant is worsen oﬀ by revealing
its technical information to the incumbent and therefore it will never launch
the oﬀer. The incumbent anticipates the entrant’s strategy and goes for in-
compatibility.
216 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the strategic choice of compatibility between two initially
incompatible goods in a two-stage game by an incumbent and an entrant ﬁrm.
Consumers enjoy network externality in consumption and maximise expected
surplus over the two periods. Compatibility may be achieved by means of a
converter.
We derive a number of results under diﬀerent assumptions about the nature
of the converter: two-way compatibility, one-way compatibility and one-way
compatibility with information disclosure and the existence of property rights.
In the case of a two-way converter, which can only be supplied by the incum-
bent, incompatibility will result in equilibrium and depending on the strength
of network externalities the incumbent may deter entry. When both ﬁrms can
build a one-way converter and there are no property rights on the necessary
technical speciﬁcations, the only fulﬁlled expectations subgame perfect equi-
librium involves full compatibility. Finally, when each ﬁrm has property rights
on its technical speciﬁcations, full incompatibility and preemption are again
observed at the equilibrium. Entry deterrence will then occur for suﬃciently
strong network eﬀects.
For expositional convenience we have referred our analysis to software
goods, but it should be clear that the analysis applies more generally to any
market exhibiting network eﬀects in which interfaces can be built to bridge
two otherwise technically incompatible networks.
22Appendix 1: Existence and uniqueness of second period FE Cournot equilib-
rium.















To prove that the second period cournot equilibrium with fulﬁlled expectations is
unique and stable, we proceed in two stages.
First let us show that assumption 1 is suﬃcient for having both the reactions curves
with fulﬁlled expectations negatively sloped and single valued. Imposing FE, namely
ˆ yI = x1
I + x2
I + ¹x2
E and ˆ yE = x2
E + Á(x1
I + x2
I), into(17) and (18), the slopes of the















which are both negative for µ < 1. This is also enough to verify that the reactions
curves are also single valued.
To guarantee existence and uniqueness of the second period equilibrium, we can
invoke Szidarowsky and Yakowitz (1977) and show that the reaction functions are
decreasing in the total industry output. From the reaction functions (17) and (18):
x2
I = A ¡ x1
I ¡ xtot + µ(ˆ yI) x2
E = A ¡ x1
I ¡ xtot + µ(ˆ yE)
where xtot = x2
I + x2
E. For any µ < 1, both these expressions deﬁne a continuous
function x2
i(xtot) which is decreasing in xtot. Therefore also the sum x2
I + x2
E is




i(xtot). The Brower’s ﬁxed point theorem guarantees the existence of the
equilibrium while the condition x2
i(xtot)0 < 0 is suﬃcient for establishing uniqueness.
Appendix 2: Existence and uniqueness of ﬁrst period FE equilibrium.
From expression (15), with FE the equilibrium level of expected (and realised) ﬁrst
period sales is the solution of x1
I = x1
I(ˆ x1
I) where (15) can be thought of as a mapping






I) is a linear function of ˆ x1
I, then to prove the existence, uniqueness and













¡3((¡1 + ¹Á)µ2 + (4 ¡ Á ¡ ¹)µ ¡ 3)µ
(Á2¹ ¡ Á + 2 ¡ 2¹Á)µ3 + (2¹ ¡ 9¹Á ¡ Á2 + 4 + 4Á)µ2 + (9Á ¡ 33 + 8¹)µ + 22
This expression provides the slope of the mapping x1
I = x1
I(ˆ x1
I) as a function of µ
given the compatibility parameters Á = 0;1 and ¹ = 0;1. It is easy to verify that
condition (19) is veriﬁed for µ < 1 for all the combinations of the compatibility
parameters except that the full incompatibility case (¹ = 0;Á = 0). In this case,
condition (19) is satisﬁed for µ < 0:704
which is the lower level of the upper bound ¯ µ.
Finally, by setting x1
I = ˆ x1
I, the ﬁrst period FEE is simply given by:
x1
I =
¡((5¹Á + 1 ¡ 2Á ¡ 4¹)µ2 + (¡4¹ ¡ Á + 9)µ ¡ 10)A
(¡Á + ¹Á ¡ 1 + Á2¹)µ3 + (¡Á2 + Á ¡ 9¹Á ¡ ¹ + 16)µ2 + (9Á ¡ 42 + 8¹)µ + 22
(20)
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